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Abstract
Background: Aggregation of spatial data is intended to protect privacy, but some effects of
aggregation on spatial methods have not yet been quantified.
Methods: We generated 3,000 spatial data sets and evaluated power of detection at 12 different
levels of aggregation using the spatial scan statistic implemented in SaTScan v6.0.
Results: Power to detect clusters decreased from nearly 100% when using exact locations to
roughly 40% at the coarsest level of spatial resolution.
Conclusion: Aggregation has the potential for obfuscation.
1 Introduction
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
define surveillance to be the ongoing, systematic collec-
tion, analysis, interpretation, and dissemination of data
about a health-related event for use in public health
action to reduce morbidity and mortality and to improve
health [1]. To control and prevent disease, it is surely
important to be vigilant for infectious disease outbreaks
or geographic areas of notably high chronic disease inci-
dence. Indeed this is a primary aim of public health sur-
veillance, and explains in part why surveillance plays an
integral role in public health practice [2].
When caring for a single patient, the clinician understand-
ably desires as much diagnostic information as possible,
and at the highest possible level of precision. Analo-
gously, a public health professional is concerned with
diagnosing a public ailment, and should similarly desire
all available information with the greatest possible level
of precision. Thus it is noteworthy, in the context of public
health surveillance, that for reasons of privacy, informa-
tion is sometimes destroyed or intentionally degraded
before being proffered to the analyst.
The argument to protect patient data for reasons of privacy
could also be used to shield these data from clinicians. In
a clinical setting, we choose not to protect the privacy of
the patient by hiding relevant information from the clini-
cian, because it is patently silly to do so. However, we
often suffer from a similarly framed argument to obscure
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population level data, even when addressing matters of
concern to the public health.
We argue that one important reason to retain important,
specific information such as precise location is that the
"requisite" aggregation for privacy necessarily reduces the
power available for outbreak detection. To balance the
cost of this and other troubles for spatial analysis [3],
aggregation does indeed make it more difficult to identify
individual patients. This is crucial if the data are made
publicly available or if there are other reasons to safeguard
privacy, but it also makes an already challenging surveil-
lance task even more difficult.
A growing body of literature addresses statistical protec-
tion of privacy and its effects on analysis of surveillance
data. Cox has written a useful survey of the general prob-
lem of confidentiality within small geographic areas, and
the impacts of privacy concerns on public health policy
and practice [4].
Armstrong et al. thoroughly discuss the design and imple-
mentation of several different approaches to protect pri-
vacy in the context of spatial analyses [5]. Importantly,
methods were evaluated both on the impact on analysis as
well as the effectiveness of preserving confidentiality. Yet
the restriction of the quantitative assessment to the Cuz-
ick-Edwards test statistic [6], which is no longer com-
monly used for spatial surveillance [7,8], limits the
application of this knowledge to a surveillance setting.
Further, data with exact locations were not considered for
this evaluation.
Waller and colleagues have written extensively on factors
that may influence power of cluster detection methods.
For example, they have studied the effects of geographic
scale on focused tests of clustering [9,10], and the impor-
tance of cluster location amidst a heterogeneous underly-
ing population [11]. Notably, this group has investigated
more than one statistical method, using several different
measures for evaluation. However these studies generally
use focused tests of clustering, where a putative exposure
source has been identified a priori, whereas surveillance
purposes typically require a general test of clustering [12].
Just as we trust clinicians and hospital personnel with sen-
sitive and confidential information, so too, one can argue,
we should find trustworthy individuals to handle surveil-
lance data responsibly.
Informatics-based approaches offer a potential compro-
mise to the trade-off between privacy and surveillance
utility. For example, development of automated surveil-
lance algorithms might allow sensitive data to be analyzed
without human intervention [13]. But in order to evaluate
the benefit that such an approach might provide, we must
first better understand the costs in performance that the
obfuscation or destruction of information may cause.
We reported briefly [14] that there is an undesirable loss
of power to detect disease outbreaks when the spatial
information provided is degraded from a continuous scale
of measurement to a coarser, aggregate level. For example,
often only a patient's ZIP code is available to a surveil-
lance system, instead of the patient's listed residential
address. Similar results have appeared in contemporane-
ous work [15], and a recent paper by the same group fur-
ther confirms this basic premise [16]. However, those
studies focused solely on exact locations compared to a
single level of aggregation.
In our present work, we add to these previous results by
considering multiple levels of aggregation. Using syn-
thetic data, we systematically quantify the loss of cluster
detection performance as a function of spatial resolution,
while limiting confounding influences from a variety of
complex factors that affect spatial analyses. We may inter-
pret these results relative to geographic scales we might
encounter while surveilling a large metropolitan city. In
this way, we attempt to clarify the price one pays for aggre-
gation, and in turn to better inform future policy decision-
makers.
2 Methods
2.1 Data
We designed a simulation study to determine the effect of
spatial aggregation on power to detect spatial clusters.
Random samples of size 90 were drawn from an underly-
ing uniform distribution on the unit disk (i.e. the Eucli-
dean circle of radius one). Atop this background sample,
we then superimpose a simulated cluster consisting of 10
points uniformly distributed in a small square at a loca-
tion randomly determined for each simulated data set
(Figure 1). Thus each simulated data set consists of a total
sample of 100 points. Although the clusters are not
defined by circles, for ease of discussion we speak of a
cluster "radius" to mean the radius of the circle inscribed
within the square cluster boundary. In the occasional
instance where the cluster center falls within one radius of
the unit disk boundary, we require that all 10 cluster
points lay within the intersection of the cluster boundary
and the unit disk.
We generated three separate sets of simulated data with
cluster radii of 0.025, 0.05 and 0.10, corresponding to dis-
ease clusters with a geographical extent equal to 2.5%,
5%, or 10% respectively of the radius of the study area.
Although this results in clusters of different intensities, the
corresponding relative risks are quite large (greater than
10) for all simulations. For each cluster radius, we gener-International Journal of Health Geographics 2007, 6:52 http://www.ij-healthgeographics.com/content/6/1/52
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ate 1, 000 data sets under these conditions, or a total of 3,
000 data sets for the entire simulation study.
To simulate spatial aggregation at different geographic
scales, we use a sequence of 12 uniform grids of varying
spacing, superimposed on the unit disk. The levels of
aggregation are chosen according to their corresponding
grid spacing, ranging from 15 grid squares per side (length
of grid square 0.067) to four grid squares per side (length
of grid square 0.25). Throughout, we use the average dis-
tance between grid points (equivalently, the average
diameter of an aggregation region) as an index of the level
of spatial aggregation (Figure 2).
By assigning all simulated data points to the nearest grid
point, these grids thereby define spatial regions of aggre-
gation. Prior to analysis, we modified each grid by adding
small amounts of bivariate jitter to each grid point (i.e.
region center). Our purpose was to mitigate the high
degree of spatial regularity across a uniform grid of assign-
ment points, and in part to reflect the non-uniform nature
of administrative regions as they appear in real systems.
We note however that the use of a uniform population
distribution implies constant population densities across
administrative region, something unlikely to be seen in a
real system.
2.2 Statistical analysis
We use SaTScan version 6.0 (2005) with a purely spatial
Bernoulli model, with cluster size constrained to be no
greater than 25% of the population. Statistical signifi-
cance of spatial clusters is determined using a nominal
Type I error rate of 0.05.
Our primary outcome is the proportion of simulated data
sets, under each level of aggregation, for which SaTScan
accurately detects the simulated cluster. We denote this
proportion as the power to detect clusters. In order to
ensure that the cluster detected by SaTScan is sufficiently
close in space to the true cluster location, we record a
detection as successful if and only if the identified cluster
center is within one cluster radius of the true cluster
center. We also record the proportion of false detections,
defined as any cluster identification with center more than
one cluster radius from the true cluster center, or failure of
any identified cluster to achieve significance level (i.e. p-
value) below 0.05.
Illustration of spatial aggregation Figure 2
Illustration of spatial aggregation. One of 12 levels of 
spatial aggregation used in this study. Grid lines define spatial 
regions of aggregation, and representative points are chosen 
randomly within each region. All simulated points are reas-
signed to the representative point of the appropriate region.
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Illustration of a simulated cluster Figure 1
Illustration of a simulated cluster. 90 points were dis-
tributed uniformly on the unit circle, and 10 additional "out-
break" points form the square "cluster" left of center.
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To measure the spatial accuracy of cluster detection, we
further consider the identification (correctly or not) of
individual data points in a significant disease cluster.
Within each simulated data set, there were 10 points of
100 that comprised the simulated cluster. For these "clus-
ter points", we calculate the proportion correctly included
in a SaTScan-identified cluster with p-value below 0.05.
Similarly for the remaining 90 "non-cluster points", we
calculate the proportion incorrectly included in a statisti-
cally significant SaTScan-identified cluster. These propor-
tions are analogous to traditional definitions of sensitivity
and 1 minus specificity, respectively, where we compare
the classification via SaTScan of points involved in a clus-
ter to the "gold standard" of cluster status as determined
by simulation design.
3 Results
Figures 3 through 6 illustrates our results. For all three sets
of simulations, power decreases as the size of aggregation
regions increases. These simulated clusters are sufficiently
large so that the power to detect for all three cluster radii
is nearly 100% when exact locations are used; this
decreases to roughly 40% at the coarsest level of aggrega-
tion, which corresponds to a more than halving of the
probability of successful detection (Figure 3).
Using exact locations, the false detection rate is approxi-
mately 2%. In the presence of any level of aggregation, the
false detection rate increases to nearly 20% or higher in all
of our simulations (Figure 4). This rate appears to increase
slowly for greater levels of aggregation.
We further evaluate the effect of aggregation on the sensi-
tivity and specificity of SaTScan (Figures 5 and 6). While
performance is nearly ideal when using exact locations,
the proportion of false negatives rises to almost 50% at
the coarsest level of aggregation. In concordance with our
earlier results, sensitivity tends to decrease as spatial aggre-
gation increases, while the false positive fraction (1 minus
specificity) follows an inverse and nearly monotonic asso-
ciation.
4 Discussion
Our results are noteworthy for a number of reasons. First,
we have used more than two levels of aggregation in an
effort to estimate the incremental effect of this aggregation
on the power of cluster detection. Second, we have further
Effect of aggregation on power Figure 3
Effect of aggregation on power. As spatial data are aggregated, power to detect clusters decreases. Horizontal axis 
denotes level of spatial aggregation, determined by radius of aggregation region; vertical axis denotes proportion of simulated 
clusters correctly identified at significance level α = 0.05.International Journal of Health Geographics 2007, 6:52 http://www.ij-healthgeographics.com/content/6/1/52
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Effect of aggregation on false detection rate Figure 4
Effect of aggregation on false detection rate. Vertical axis denotes proportion of simulations where spurious clusters are 
detected.
Effect of aggregation on sensitivity Figure 5
Effect of aggregation on sensitivity. Identification of cases involved in an outbreak becomes more difficult as data are 
aggregated. Vertical axis denotes proportion of cases falsely identified as outside the disease cluster (false negatives).International Journal of Health Geographics 2007, 6:52 http://www.ij-healthgeographics.com/content/6/1/52
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investigated the effect of aggregation on the rate of false
detection. Finally, when viewed in the context of similar
studies, our results add to a body of evidence that the
underlying relationships reported appear robust to differ-
ing geographies and population distributions.
Our calculation of power and false detection differs from
the same measures as otherwise used in an important way.
We expect a certain proportion of spurious "clusters" to
arise by chance alone. Thus we have placed an additional
requirement on what we denote a successful identification
of a cluster, namely that the identified cluster be proximal
to the true cluster as determined by the simulation design.
Because our simulations involve only one cluster per data
set, an identification far from the true cluster is genuinely
spurious and must be considered a false detection in this
context. Indeed, for practical purposes such an identifica-
tion might divert resources for investigation to a geo-
graphic area not related to the true outbreak or cluster
present in the data.
To place our results in context, consider the metropolitan
Boston area. The city and adjacent suburbs can be
enclosed in a circle of radius roughly 7, 500 meters.
Although the size of city ZIP codes and census tracts var-
ies, an approximate median radius for Boston ZIP codes is
roughly 1, 500 meters, or 20% of the region radius. Bos-
ton census tracts have an approximate median radius of
500 meters, or 6.7% of the region radius. Thus census tract
and ZIP code aggregation of Boston data corresponds
roughly to our first and penultimate levels of aggregation
respectively. Likewise, the simulated clusters of radii
0.025, 0.05, and 0.10 correspond to disease outbreaks
smaller than one census tract, about one census tract, or
several census tracts (perhaps a small ZIP code) respec-
tively.
The number of false detections rose well above the nomi-
nal alpha level when spatial data were aggregated. Inter-
estingly, the level of aggregation does not appear to be a
major contributor to false alarms; rather, there is an
immediate increase upon aggregation above the nominal
false alarm rate, with little additional increase for further
aggregation. To our knowledge, this has not been reported
previously. Since false alarms form a major limitation to
the actionable consequences of cluster detection, this
issue should be considered carefully. Even in situations
where loss of power is not severe, the increase in false
detection rates may impose further limits of the utility of
spatial methods when using aggregated data.
Effect of aggregation on specificity Figure 6
Effect of aggregation on specificity. Vertical axis denotes proportion of cases falsely identified as inside the cluster (false 
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Our study is limited in several ways. We have only
included an evaluation of SaTScan as a test of clustering,
although we have seen similar results using other meth-
ods [14]. The use of synthetic data is both helpful and
harmful to generalizability of results. There are few popu-
lations that even approximate a homogeneous and uni-
form distribution, and thus the simulated data sets do not
reflect a realistic surveillance scenario. However, using a
homogeneous distribution removes some of the poten-
tially confounding interactions between cluster location,
geography, population distribution, and spatial methods.
Thus despite its limitations, our study contributes to an
understanding of the complex association between spatial
resolution and power of detection.
We chose not to investigate spatio-temporal methods
(implemented for example with a space-time scan, also
available using SaTScan). Space-time interactions imply
greater complexity when considering effects of spatial
aggregation (or indeed, temporal aggregation), and the
potential parameter space of simulation studies increases
greatly as well. For this and other reasons, the effect of spa-
tial aggregation (or indeed, temporal aggregation) in a
cluster detection context remains an area for further inves-
tigation.
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